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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLORIA HAYLEY ASHBY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DALLEN BEN ASHBY, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
CASE NO. 20080737-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court issued a writ of certiorari in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether the court of appeals was correct in reversing the trial 
court's dismissal of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court gives the lower court's ruling no 
deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE 2: Whether the court of appeals was correct in reversing the trial 
court's dismissal of Plaintiff s unjust enrichment claim for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a question of law, the appellate court gives the lower court's ruling no 
deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. 
St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) - Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 - Addendum B 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Gloria Hayley Ashby ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint for divorce in the 
Third District Court on October 11, 2007. In addition to pleading a cause of action 
for divorce, the complaint alleged that Dallen Ben Ashby ("Defendant") had 
breached his contract with Plaintiff and was therefore liable for damages. 
2 
2. On April 12, 2006, the court entered a bifurcated decree of divorce, 
reserving all other issues for trial. 
3. On August 18, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs 
contract claim. 
4. On August 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a 
claim for unjust enrichment and filed her response to the motion to dismiss. 
5- On September 27, 2006, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, 
the case was transferred to the Fourth District Court where it was assigned case 
number 064402051 (the "divorce action55).1 
The divorce action went to trial on December 12, 2007, where the sole issue was 
alimony, all other issues having been resolved by stipulation. The trial court 
ordered that no alimony be awarded even though it specifically found that 
Defendant was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage and even though it found 
that he would be making and unknown but substantial income within a few years 
from the date of the trial. See Memorandum Decision, Case No. 064402051 (copy 
attached hereto as Addendum C) ("Memorandum Decision55) at 3-4. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff appealed the trial court's order and judgment. That appeal has been fully 
briefed and was scheduled for oral argument before the Utah Court of Appeals on 
February 25, 2009. In response to Plaintiffs filing a suggestion for certification, 
however, the court of appeals stayed all proceedings in that case (including the 
scheduled oral argument) until resolution of this appeal and denied the suggestion 
to certify. 
Plaintiff submits that certification of the divorce action appeal to this Court so that 
that case may be considered together with this one would make sense. Indeed, the 
court below stated: 
In terms of judicial economy, the contract and unjust enrichment 
claims grow out of the same nucleus of facts and should be considered 
together, one place or another. And any real difficulty is avoided in 
3 
6. On October 11, 2006, oral argument on the motion to dismiss was 
heard by Commissioner Thomas Patton, at which time he recommended that the 
motion to dismiss be granted. Specifically, the Commissioner ruled that, under 
Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985), contract and unjust enrichment 
claims must be filed separately from a divorce action. 
7. On December 11, 2006, the court (Judge Howard) adopted the 
commissioner's recommendation and dismissed from the divorce action the breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment claims for improper joinder. This order was not 
appealed. 
8. Based on that dismissal, on December 22, 2006, Plaintiff re-filed her 
breach of contract and unjust claims as a separate action in a new complaint 
("Complaint"). (R. 1-5.) 
9. On January 22, 2007, Defendant filed am answer to the Complaint and 
a motion to dismiss. (R. 6-7, 32-34.) 
this case because the same judge who handled the divorce case was 
also assigned the instant case and thus had "the big picture." 
Ashby v. Ashby, 2008 UT App 25, f^ 5 n.l. Although the court of appeals was 
incorrect in its assertion that this case and the divorce case were before the same 
trial judge who therefore had the "big picture," the court's legal analysis was 
correct. Having one court consider both of these cases together can only assist in 
arriving at the proper resolution. 
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10. On March 6, 2007, the trial court (Judge Hansen), after briefing but 
without a hearing, issued a memorandum ruling granting the motion to dismiss. (R. 
61-65.) 
11. On April 12, 2006, the trial court signed the order dismissing 
Plaintiffs Complaint and thus terminated the case in the trial court. (R. 68-70.) 
12. On April 19, 2006, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal. (R. 71-73.) 
13. After full briefing and oral argument, on July 3, 2008, the Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision as to both the breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment claims and remanded them for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 6, 1997, and 
remained so until April 12, 2006, when the Third District Court (Judge Terry 
Christiansen) granted a bifurcated decree of divorce. Complaint f^ 5. 
2. Prior to and during their marriage, Defendant requested that Plaintiff 
work and support him during the years that he was obtaining his undergraduate and 
medical degrees. In return, Defendant promised to provide for and support 
2
 Because, as discussed hereafter, the Court is required to accept as true the facts 
pleaded in the Complaint when considering the propriety of a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6), the facts stated herein are taken directly from Plaintiffs 
Complaint. All references to the Complaint are referring to R. 1-5. 
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Plaintiff thereafter at a certain level with the income he would earn as the holder of 
a medical degree. Complaint | f 8, 13. 
3. Defendant further requested that Plaintiff forego an opportunity 
presented to her to take over an ongoing, successful business so that she could 
accompany him to Missouri while he attended medical school. Complaint % 14. 
4. Defendant further requested Plaintiff forego or delay indefinitely her 
efforts to earn her bachelors degree. Complaint ^ 15. 
5. Defendant further requested Plaintiff to live at a lower standard of 
living than would otherwise have been necessary during the period of his 
education, both undergraduate and graduate. Complaint f 16. 
6. Plaintiff agreed to each of these requests because of her 
understanding, based upon communications with Defendant, that these sacrifices 
would allow him to earn a much higher income and that she would be the 
beneficiary thereof. Complaint ^J17. In other words, Plaintiff accepted 
Defendant's offer and fully performed her obligations under the bargain by 
working and providing support for Defendant during his educational years. 
Complaint ^ 9. 
7. During their marriage and as a result of Plaintiff s contributions and 
sacrifices, Defendant obtained a medical degree and is now in the process of 
6 
beginning a career in radiology, in which he can be expected to earn a substantial 
income for the rest of his working life. Complaint f 18. 
8. Defendant breached his obligation to Plaintiff in that as soon as he 
finished medical school and obtained his degree, he stopped supporting Plaintiff. 
Indeed, through various acts and omissions on his part, Defendant has made it 
intolerable for Plaintiff to continue to reside with him, thus preventing his fulfilling 
of his obligations by means of living together as husband and wife. Complaint 
l i o . 
9. By foregoing specific opportunities presented to her, by working to 
earn an income to support Defendant, and by giving up a higher standard of living, 
Plaintiff conferred a benefit on Defendant. Complaint ^ 19. 
10. Defendant was fully aware of the conferral of this benefit at all times 
relevant hereto. Complaint j^ 20. 
11. Plaintiff did not confer this benefit officiously or gratuitously or solely 
for her own benefit. Moreover, the benefit to Defendant was direct and intentional, 
not merely incidental to some other action. Complaint f 21. 
12. The circumstances surrounding the conferral of this benefit were such 
that it would be unjust to allow Defendant to retain the benefit conferred by 
Plaintiff without compensating Plaintiff therefore. In particular, Plaintiff conferred 
this benefit on Defendant at great personal effort and sacrifice, including foregoing 
7 
her own business and educational opportunities, some of which are now lost 
forever. Complaint f^ 22. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Defendant had not shown that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her breach 
of contract or unjust enrichment claims, Plaintiff asks this Court to affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals which reversed the trial court decision granting 
Defendant's motion to dismiss. Indeed, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges facts that are 
sufficient to establish viable claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 
Thus, because this Court must consider the allegations in the Complaint as being 
true in its consideration of the lower courts' decisions, the appellate court's ruling 
should be affirmed. 
The Complaint establishes a viable breach of contract claim because it 
alleges: (1) There was an agreement between the parties to the effect that if 
Plaintiff supported Defendant during his medical school studies, Defendant would 
thereafter support Plaintiff with the niceties of life that go with the substantial 
income that would result from the medical degree; (2) Plaintiff performed all of her 
obligations under the agreement by supporting Defendant during his medical 
school studies; (3) Defendant breached the agreement by failing to support Plaintiff 
since his graduation from medical school and has anticipatorily breached his 
obligation to support her at income levels he will be earning after he finishes his 
8 
residency; and (4) Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer damages from 
Defendant's breach of his obligations because Plaintiff is now forced to work full 
time in a less lucrative career than she otherwise would have been able to, and will 
not enjoy the level of income that Defendant promised her after he finishes his 
residency and fellowship. 
In addition, the facts of this case show starkly the limitations of alimony as a 
method by which Defendant can perform his obligations under the contract and 
cure the injustice inflicted on Plaintiff. It is only after he completes his residency, 
shortly before the statutory alimony period will expire, that Defendant will be 
earning a significant income. This will leave only a very short period within which 
Defendant will be able to use alimony as a means of performing his contractual 
obligation to support Plaintiff at the promised level of income. 
Finally, the statute of frauds does not bar Plaintiffs breach of contract claim 
for three separate reasons: first, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff had no 
obligation to plead that the agreement between the parties complied with the 
statute; second, the terms of the agreement did not require all performance of the 
agreement to completed within one year, nor was it impossible that Plaintiffs 
obligations be perfomied within one year; and, third, Plaintiff has at least partially 
performed her obligations under the agreement, thereby taking the entire matter 
outside the statute of frauds. 
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The Complaint also establishes a viable claim for unjust enrichment because 
it alleges that (1) Plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant by supporting him 
through medical school, (2) Defendant not only knew about and appreciated the 
benefit but in addition bargained for it, and (3) Plaintiffs conferral of this benefit 
on Defendant makes it unjust for Defendant to fail to compensate Plaintiff 
therefore. Again, for the reasons stated above, alimony is an insufficient method 
for Defendant to compensate Plaintiff for the benefit conferred upon him. 
Thus, because Plaintiffs Complaint establishes viable claims for breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment, and because alimony is an insufficient method of 
compensating Plaintiff under these claims and curing the injustice inflicted upon 
her, the trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed as to both the breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARDS FOR ANALYZING A DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 
12(b)(6) 
It is basic procedural law that on a motion to dismiss, a court must consider 
the allegations in the complaint as being true and must read those allegations in the 
light most favorable to and with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the 
non-moving party. Fenn v. MLeads Enterprises, Inc., 2006 UT 8 f 2, 137 P.3d 
706, 709 (Utah 2006). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) will be affirmed only if it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
10 
state of facts which could be proven in support of it claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves 
& Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990). When reviewing a dismissal under 
this rule, an appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as 
true, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that 
the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim. Colman v. Utah 
State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the 
appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it under a 
correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
196 (Utah 1991). 
D(. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
REVERSAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT STATES A VIABLE CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
A. The Facts Alleged in the Complaint Are Sufficient to Establish a 
Breach of Contract Claim 
The dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint should be reversed because it states a 
viable claim for breach of contract. Under Utah law, the elements of a breach of 
contract claim are: "(1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, 
(3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom 
Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20 ^ 14, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). In the instant 
case, each of these elements is present, 
11 
First, the parties had a valid contract. The elements of a valid contract are 
"proper subject matter, offer and acceptance, competent parties, and 
consideration." Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 
1197 (Utah App. 1992). There is nothing improper or unlawful about a man and a 
woman making an agreement whereby one agrees to pay for the education of the 
other in exchange for a certain financial compensation. Similarly, there is no issue 
as to the competency of the parties to have entered into this agreement, which can 
readily be inferred from the allegations of the Complaint. Next, Defendant offered 
to provide Plaintiff with the niceties of life that go with the substantial income of a 
medical doctor in exchange for her supporting him during his undergraduate and 
medical studies. Complaint f^ 8. Plaintiff accepted this offer. Complaint f 9. The 
terms of the offer and acceptance included mutual consideration. Specifically, 
Plaintiff provided the consideration of agreeing to support Defendant through his 
educational years. Complaint j^ 8. Similarly, Defendant agreed to support Plaintiff 
thereafter at a significant level. Id. Accordingly, all the elements of a lawful valid 
contract are present. 
Second, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff performed her obligations under 
the contract by supporting Defendant during his educational years. Complaint <|[ 9. 
Third, Defendant breached the contract by failing to support Plaintiff since 
his graduation from medical school and has anticipatorily breached hus obligation 
12 
to support her at the income levels he will be earning after he finishes his 
residency. Complaint f 10. 
Finally, Plaintiff has suffered damages and will continue to suffer damages 
from Defendant's breach of the contract. Complaint 111. Plaintiff is now 
working full-time, not by choice, but because she has no other means of support. 
Plaintiff will not enjoy the income that Defendant promised her. Although not 
specifically pled in the Complaint, the Court should accept these facts as true 
because they are reasonably inferable given the facts alleged in the Complaint. 
Defendant asserts that there are numerous questions that suggest the alleged 
contract must fail for lack of definiteness. 
l 
What if Husband chose to change careers? What if chose to work for 
a job that generated less income than expected? How long was Wife 
to work - only while Husband was in school, during his internship 
and/or residency, or until they had children? What was the level of 
income promised by Husband to ensure he met the standard of living 
contemplated by Wife? 
Brief of Petitioner at 7-8/ Defendant, however, fails to acknowledge that this 
matter arises based on the trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. The answers to each of these questions may, at this stage, be answered 
by inferences, and the Court is obligated to accept only those inferences that favor 
3
 The case law cited by Defendant, Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169 and Stangl 
v^  Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976), both held that the contracts before them were 
unenforceable as insufficiently definite but did so only after taking evidence on the 
matter, either as part of a summary judgment motion or after trial. 
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Plaintiff. Later, these questions will be answered by a trial and a record based 
upon evidence, not Defendant's current speculations. 
B. The Martinez Decision is Not Relevant to the Viability of 
Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim 
Defendant's primary argument against Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is 
that it is contrary to Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). In that case, 
the supreme court rejected the claim that a working spouse should receive 
"equitable restitution" to compensate her for her contributions to the marriage 
while her husband was pursuing higher education. That case, however, is wholly 
distinguishable from that now before this Court. First, in Martinez there was no 
breach of contract claim presented. As shown above, not only is Plaintiff seeking a 
remedy for breach of contract, she has adequately pled that claim. Second, in 
Martinez, there was no allegation of an agreement that the working spouse would 
do certain specific things to enable the student spouse to complete his education. 
Again, this case is different in that Plaintiff has proffered such allegations. 
Indeed, the only basis Defendant raises for even considering the Martinez 
case in connection with Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is the Martinez court's 
discussion of marriage in general. See, e.g., Martinez, 818 P.2d at 540 ("Although 
marriage is a partnership in some respects, a marriage is certainly not comparable 
to a commercial partnership.") This statement, however, cannot be understood to-
mean that there can never be a breach of contract claim by one spouse against 
14 
another. For instance, assume a situation where a doctor hired his spouse to work 
in his office to manage the practice and oversee billing and other clerical matters 
and agreed to pay a specific wage or salary. If Defendant's reading of Martinez 
\ \ 
were correct, the spouse would have no recourse if the doctor failed to pay for the 
work performed. The arguments that Plaintiff raises here will not apply to all 
divorces because many, if not most, marriages do not have the 
commercial/contractual nature that the Martinez court referred to. As in the 
hypothetical situation just discussed, however, the parties in this case themselves 
chose to import such concepts into their marriage. When both parties agree to such 
an arrangement, the courts should not refuse to honor that choice. See, e.g., 
Dorsettv. Dorsett, 111 S.E. 541, 543 (N.C. 1922). 
Defendant tries to skirt this issue by asserting a distinction between 
agreements that are intrinsic to the marriage relationship and those that are 
extrinsic: 
Most agreements between spouses relate to decisions that are 
intrinsic and commonplace to a marital relationship such as (1) 
deciding how many children to have, (2) whether one or both spouses 
will work, or (3) where to live. 
However, there are some agreements extrinsic to a marital 
relationship that spouses may enter together such as (1) a partnership 
or business relationship, (2) an employer-employee relationship 
between spouses, or (3) written financial arrangements between 
spouses where separate property is involved as collateral or for 
lending. 
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The fact of this case are essentially present in every marriage. 
Spouses routinely discuss their individual and collective employment 
or educational aspirations and take steps to achieve those goals. 
Brief of Petitioner at 7. The record provides absolutely no basis for Defendant's 
factual assertions here. Additionally, Defendant cites no authority for such a 
distinction. Moreover, on their face these conclusions seem somewhat 
contradictory. For instance, Defendant would have this Court believe that a 
couple's decision as to whether the wife will work is intrinsic (and therefore not 
the subject of a breach of contract claim) but whether she will work for the 
husband is an extrinsic decision and therefore subject to the full panoply of legal 
remedies. One might pity the trial court that would have to apply the distinction 
between those decisions that intrinsic and those that are extrinsic. 
Defendant also asserts two additional holdings of the Martinez case, i.e., 
(1) that an award of "equitable restitution" would be too speculative, and (2) that a 
person's educational degree may not be divided as marital property in a divorce. 
Brief of Petitioner at 9, 10. These assertions also fell short. First, it is certainly 
possible that in a particular case an agreement may be too speculative to support a 
judgment of breach of contract. That does not mean that we throw out the entire 
claim on the pleadings before a trial has been held or even before any discovery is 
had. Whether a particular claim is too speculative is a question of fact, not one of 
pleading. 
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Second, even though the courts will not grant a divorcing a spouse an 
interest in her husband's educational degree, that does not preclude a contractual 
right to such an interest. Two men may agree that one will support the other in his 
graduate education on condition that the other will repay the favor by paying to the 
one a percentage of the other's income for a specific number of years after 
graduation. These two men may even set a minimum annual payment to ensure 
that the one does not avoid his obligation by not fully exploiting his training and 
education. Defendant has provided no reason that such an arrangement would be 
permissible between to male friends but not between spouses. 
While it may be true under Martinez that a marriage relationship standing 
alone will be insufficient to create a right to "equitable restitution," the relationship 
between Plaintiff and Defendant was not so limited. Neither should Plaintiffs 
available remedies. The import of the trial court's dismissal can be understood by 
further comparing the facts of this case with those of the hypothetical in the 
I 
previous paragraph. In that situation, if the individual that received the assistance 
failed to make the repayments, the other party would have a clear claim for breach 
of contract. This means that Defendant is actually asserting marriage as a defense 
to breach of contract.4 That is surely not what the Martinez court intended. 
That this is Defendant's true aim is witnessed by the fact that nowhere in his 
motion to dismiss papers, his briefing before the court of appeals, nor in his 
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While it may be true that there are no published decisions from Utah courts 
holding that marriage is not a defense to a breach of contract claim, that does not 
mean there are no decisions available to give guidance to the Court. In particular, 
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. App. 1982), is especially 
helpful. That case presented the court with a situation similar to that before this 
Court: The wife agreed to "'put him through three years of law school without his 
having to work, and when he finished, he would put [her] through for [her] masters 
degree without [her] having to work.'5' Id at 349, 661 P.2d at 199 (alterations in 
original). After the husband graduated from law school and after the couple had 
deferred her education an additional two years due to his income shortfall, he told 
her that he wanted a divorce. 
The wife included breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims in her 
divorce petition. After trial, the trial court found in favor of the wife on both 
claims and the husband appealed. On appeal, the court reversed the breach of 
contract claim. Specifically, the court held that the evidence presented at trial 
failed to establish the terms of the contract with sufficient definiteness. Id. at 350, 
661 P.2d at 200. Specifically, the agreement as proven at trial did not specify 
opening brief before this Court did Defendant even identify the elements necessary 
to plead a prima facie case of breach of contract (or of unjust enrichment). 
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when or where the wife would attend graduate school or how long her graduate 
program would take to complete. Id. at 350-51, 661 P.2d at 200-0L5 
It is important to note what the Pyeatte court did not hold - that breach of 
contract claims in a marriage context are not legally recognized. If, as Defendant 
suggests, such an action could not be pursued, the Pyeatte court would have 
dismissed on those grounds rather than looking to whether the terms of the contract 
Were sufficiently definite, a fact-specific inquiry. 
The Martinez court did not even pretend to address the issues presented by 
this case. Indeed, the Martinez court stated explicitly that it was limiting its 
I I 
analysis to whether the law recognizes "equitable restitution." Martinez, 818 P.2d 
at 538 ("This case is here on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals to 
review the single issue of whether that court erred in fashioning a new remedy in 
divorce cases which it called equitable restitution and which may be awarded in 
addition to alimony, child support, and property." (emphases added)); id. at 543 
("We granted certiorari solely on the issue of equitable restitution and denied 
5
 The Pyeatte court also rejected the wife's claim that she should be awarded a 
larger share of the marital estate because the husband took with him an asset- his 
legal degree and license - obtained with marital property. The court followed 
Arizona precedent holding that educational degrees and licenses are not property. 
Id. at 351-52, 661 P.2d at 201-02 (citing Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 
115 (Ariz. App. 1981)). Because this Court has previously reached the same 
conclusion, see Martinez, 818 P.2d at 541-42, Plaintiff has not made this type of 
claim in the divorce action. 
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certiorari on all other issues." (emphases added)). The Court should not view itself 
as bound in anyway by that decision. Instead, the Court should view this case as 
one of first impression in this state. 
C. Defendant Cannot Perform His Contractual Obligations Through 
the Payment of Alimony 
Defendant also argues that the remedy for Defendant's breaches must be 
limited to that found in Utah Code 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii). That provision provides the 
divorce court shall, in determining whether to award alimony and the amount 
thereof, consider the contributions one spouse made to the other's education and 
earning power during the marriage. Brief of Petitioner at 7, 11-12, 14-15. The 
facts of this case, however, show starkly the limitations of alimony as a method by 
which Defendant can perform his contractual obligations and cure the injustices 
inflicted on Plaintiff. 
First, Defendant's brief makes it appear that in the natural course of things, 
Plaintiff will be awarded, as part of the alimony to be awarded to her in connection 
with her divorce, all she is entitled to for her claims in the Complaint. Defendant 
fails to acknowledge that he fought any award of alimony to Plaintiff and, at least 
in the trial court, he was wholly successful. The Utah divorce statute is simply no 
guarantee that a spouse who specifically contracts for a certain compensation will 
be granted that compensation through divorce; the vagaries of divorce proceedings 
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are too incalculable to require spouses to rely solely on that to protect their 
expectations. 
Making it even worse, by statute, a court may not, absent "extenuating 
circumstances/' impose an alimony obligation extending beyond the length of the 
marriage at issue. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h). A review of case law on this 
subject shows only one appellate case where an award of alimony extending 
beyond the length of the marriage was approved. In Kelley v. Kelley, 2003 UT 
App 317, 79 P.3d 428 (Utah App. 2003), the court held that the trial court was 
justified in finding extenuating circumstances to allow such an award of alimony. 
I I 
The specific circumstances were that the parties had been married for fourteen 
years which ended in a "sham divorce" (i.e., for financial reasons only). After this 
divorce, the parties continued to live together in a common law marriage 
relationship. The wife then filed for divorce. The trial court found that although 
the length of the second marriage was only five years, the alimony should be based 
on the length of the entire relationship. The court of appeals affirmed: 
holding that under the unusual facts of this case the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding extenuating circumstances where, after 
what was essentially a sham divorce, the parties continued to live in 
exactly the same factual situation as they had previously. Conversely, 
in the somewhat more usual, but still comparatively rare, 
circumstance of a couple divorcing, reconciling later, and remarrying, 
there would not be, without more, the requisite extraordinariness. 
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Id. at f 7, n.3, 79 P.3d 430. Thus, even the relatively unusual circumstance of two 
parties divorcing, reconciling, marrying, and divorcing again will not constitute 
extenuating circumstances. It is far from certain that the appellate courts will 
approve a finding of extenuating circumstances when faced with uthe not 
uncommon" situation, see Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis.2d 1, 7, 318 N.W.2d 
918, 921 (Wis. 1982), of a divorce happening at the end of significant graduate 
studies in breach of various promises of future support. 
The statutory limitation on alimony is significant in this case because for the 
next three or four years, Defendant's income is expected to remain fairly modest. 
It is only after he completes his residency, shortly before the statutory alimony 
period will expire, that Defendant would be earning significant amounts. This will 
leave only a very short period within which Defendant could use alimony as a 
means to perform his contractual obligations and repay Plaintiff for the debt which 
he has incurred. Moreover, any such alimony would cease should Plaintiff remarry 
or cohabitate, even though Defendant would be free to do so without consequence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8), -5(9). 
Defendant relies heavily on the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Of 
course, nowhere does that statute (or any other statute) state that it is to be the 
exclusive remedy between divorcing spouses and that any contract or other legal or 
equitable claim between the two parties are preempted by the statute. 
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The Court should not leave Plaintiff subject to both the inherent and 
unpredictable limits of alimony. Rather, justice requires that the spouse that has 
I 
performed such services for her student spouse not be left out in the cold, while the 
| I 
student spouse goes on to enjoy the fruits of both their labors, especially where the 
I 
latter spouse expressly agreed to the contrary. Instead, the non-breaching spouse 
should be granted the benefit of her bargain, which, in this case, requires more than 
she might be able to obtain under alimony. 
D. Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim Is Not Barred by the Statute 
of Frauds 
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs breach of contract claim on the basis that 
it was barred by the statute of frauds.6 Specifically, it relied on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-4(1 )(a), which states in pertinent part: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some 
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the 
party to be charged with the agreement: . . . (a) every agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making of 
the agreement.... 
6
 Although Defendant pressed this point strongly before the trial court and the 
court of appeals, in his opening brief before this Court, he has dropped this 
argument to little more than a mention. Brief of Petitioner at 1. Accordingly, the 
Court should consider this argument waived. American Towers Owners Ass'n. v. 
CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by 
an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned.") In the event the Court actually 
considers this argument, Plaintiff presents the following argument. 
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n 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1).' There are three reasons, one procedural and two 
substantive, why this provision cannot be used to support the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim in this case. 
1. The Statute of Frauds Is an Affirmative Defense that Need 
Not Be Pleaded by Plaintiff 
Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that when pleading a 
claim for relief, the pleader must include "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As noted above in Section 2.A., 
Plaintiff has done that by pleading each of the elements of a breach of contract 
claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff has complied with the pleading requirements 
applicable to this case. 
Because this appeal is addressing the propriety of a motion to dismiss, the 
Court is limited to considering the pleadings only. At this stage, there are only two 
ways that Defendant can assert the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant 
violated the statute of frauds: (1) to point to an allegation in the Complaint 
alleging that there was no writing memorializing the agreement, or (2) to impose 
on Plaintiff an obligation to plead a disclaimer of a violation of the statute of 
n 
Although there are other statute of frauds provisions in the Utah Code that could 
be argued to apply to this matter, the trial court did not rely on any of them. 
Moreover, Defendant failed to argue any of these provisions before the court of 
appeals. Any applicability of these provisions is thus waived. American Towers, 
930 P.2d at 1185 n.5 ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and 
abandoned.") 
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frauds. As to the first, in this case:, i lotl lii ig in tl le Cot i lplaint can be cotistri led to 
allege t.1 lat the agreement between the parties was not in writing. As to the second, 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly places on the party 
responding to a prior pleading the burden of setting forth any of various affirmative 
defenses, including statute frauds, statute of limitations, accord and satisfaction, 
assumption of risk, etc. If Defendant's position were to be accepted, thei1 logic a 11) 
Plaintiff woilid have been reci. ,; •• rr..p.i •.= \c .uiw • •• ^ ' Mi* -^
Plaintiff and Defendant was in writing, but also that the statute of limitations had 
not run, that there had been no accord and satisfaction, and that Plaintiff had not 
assumed the risk. That is not the state of law. 
The court of appeals was correct when it concluded that, in order for 
Defendant to prevail on his Rule 12(b)(6) motion with respect to an affirmative 
defense, he must show that there is a facial deficiency in the Complaint. Ashby v. 
Ashby, 2008 U i App ZJ, *| 10 (citing Heiner v. d.J. Groves & Sons Co,, 790 P.2d 
107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). He has not done so and this argument should be 
rejected. 
2. Plaintiffs Contract with Defendant Does Not Come Within 
the Statute of Frauds 
' ' Next, tl lis provisioi i oi il> applies to a cot ltract "tl lat by its tei m. s is i lo t tc I: • z 
performed within one year. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(a) (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting this one-year-requirement, has 
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stated that "[t]he question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual 
performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the 
reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed 
within one year." Warner v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 434 (1896). 
Thus, this provision plainly establishes that the requirement of a writing does not 
apply unless "by its terms" the contract "requires" that the agreement not be 
performed in one year. 
Utah case law in accordance with the Warner decision. In Pasquin v. 
Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, 988 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1999), the court stated: "we 
reiterate the well-settled proposition that the one-year clause applies only to 
contracts that are literally incapable of being performed within one year." See 
1999 UT App 245 ^ 18, 988 P.2d at 6 (emphasis in original). There are a number 
of cases establishing that even unexpected and highly unlikely occurrences that 
might prevent the term of the contract from extending beyond one year are 
sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Zion's Serv. 
Corp. v. Danielson, 366 P.2d 982, 984-85 (Utah 1961) (holding that a contract 
entered into by the individual members of an incorporated trade association was 
not barred by the one year clause because each member of the corporation was free 
to leave at any time and, thus, the agreement was capable of performance within 
one year); Johnson v. Johnson, 88 P. 230, 231 (Utah 1906) (holding that, where the 
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agreement was that the buyer of property would supply a per cei itage of tl ic ci ops to 
the seller each year, the agreement was i lot barred fa) ' the stati tie of frai ids becai lse 
the seller could die within one year). 
These cases establish that for the one-year-rule to bar a claim under the 
statute of frauds, it must be impossible for the performance to be completed within 
one year. In this case, it is clear that the parties' contract was not impossible to 
fully perform within one year. Any number of things may have happened within 
one yeai that would have ended the contract. For example, Defei idai it com ild 1: la ' e 
voluntarily chosen not to continue his education; Defendant's poor academic 
performance or medical circumstances could have rendered continuing his 
education impossible or impracticable; Defendant may have been the victim of a 
tragic accident or death which precluded additional education; or the parties may 
have become financially unable to continue his education despite Plaintiffs efforts. 
If for any of these reasons (or any other reason) Defendant 1: lad ceased his 
edi icatioi lal pi ii si lits within oiu: ' :^ = Plaintiffs performance would have been 
fulfilled. 
That these occurrences were unlikely is not relevant. They are in no way 
different than the possible death of the seller of the property in Johnson, which 
may also have been unlikely. In addition, tl: mt these occurrences did i lot actually 
happen is also irrelevant. Again,' -ie question: 1 is i: lot w 1: lat the probable, oi: 
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expected, or actual performance of the contract was, but whether the contract . . . 
required that it should not be performed within one year. Warner, 164 U.S. at 434 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, because the terms of the contract do not require that performance not 
to be rendered within one year, and because it was possible that performance could 
be completed within one year, Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is not barred by 
the statute of frauds. Therefore, because Plaintiffs Complaint states a viable claim 
for breach of contract, and is not barred by the any version of the statue of frauds, 
the dismissal of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim must be reversed. 
3. Even If the Statute Applied, Plaintiffs Partial Performance 
Takes This Case Out of the Statute 
Even if one were to assume that the statute of frauds applies to this particular 
contract, there are a number of circumstances where the courts will enforce the 
contract even though there was no required writing. In this case, the relevant 
circumstance is Plaintiffs partial performance. To take an oral agreement out of 
the statute of frauds, Plaintiff must show three things. 
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; second, the 
acts done in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; 
and third, the acts must be in reliance on the contract. 
Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956). 
In this case, Plaintiff has been given no opportunity to make the required 
showings. There have been no depositions taken; there have been no 
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interrogatories promulgated ; ;C^UV>K\ rj \^ : :• 
bi lrdei i to establish the partial performance defense, she i i n ist be given an 
opportunity to do so. The trial court's dismissal of the case denied her that 
opportunity. 
Indeed, this issue goes back to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard discussed above. 
Under that standard, the claim may be dismissed only if the record establishes that 
it is impossible for Plaintiff to prove any set of circumstances uiiuer •.-.•hu ;^ ' 
might be granted. In this case, that means that before the claim may be dismissed, 
the Court must be certain that, even if the statute of frauds applies, Plaintiff can in 
no way prove a partial performance defense. On the record now before the Court, 
the Court cannot reach such a conclusion. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
REVERSAL OF THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT ST A TES A VIABI ,E CLAIM FOR 
IJNJT1ST ENRICHMENT 
T irt's dismissal of t— :1 w>
 ti 
allowed to stand because the Complaint states a viable claim for unjust enrichment. 
The elements of such a claim are: 1) a benefit conferred on one person by another, 
2) the person receiving the benefit must appreciate or have knowledge of the 
benefit; and the person receiving the benefits retains it under circumstances 
making it unjust for him to retain it with- ]< •• nsating tK-' !v*»* • "> fh:< • op»- ^i 
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the benefit. Deseret Miriah Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 2000 UT 83 \ 13, 12 P.3d 580, 
582 (Utah 2000). Plaintiff has pled each element. 
First, Defendant received his medical degree which was made possible 
because of Plaintiff s efforts and sacrifices; that is, Plaintiff conferred this benefit 
on Defendant. Complaint \ 18. Defendant was aware of this benefit during all 
times while he was receiving it. Complaint fflf 19-20. Finally, the circumstances of 
Plaintiffs conferral of this benefit on Defendant make it unjust for Defendant to 
retain the benefit without compensating Plaintiff therefor. Complaint \ 22. Again, 
as shown above, because of the statutory limitations connected with alimony, 
alimony is an insufficient means by which Defendant can compensate Plaintiff for 
the benefit incurred upon him and remedy the injustice inflicted upon her. 
Accordingly, Defendant cannot argue against Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim 
except to assert that unjust enrichment cannot be found in the context of a marital 
relationship, i.e., that marriage is again a defense to a claim. 
Defendant relies on Martinez to defeat this claim as well as the breach of 
contract claim discussed above. Again, Martinez is distinguishable. It did not 
involve a specific promise by the working spouse to forego personal opportunities 
and to provide for the student spouse in exchange for a specific promise by the 
student spouse to provide future support at certain levels. Indeed, the facts of 
Martinez are precisely the opposite: Mr. Martinez attended medical school over 
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Mrs. Martinez's objection 818 I \2( 1 at 539. It istead. tl ic A iai tinez case ii I \ ol veil 
oi lly a generic claim for divorce; il dul not involve a legally sufficient claim for 
unjust enrichment. Moreover, the Martinez court limited its analysis to the 
specific issue of "equitable restitution" then before it: "We granted certiorari 
solely on the issue of equitable restitution and denied certiorari on all other issues. 
We therefore express no opinion on the appropriateness of the other modifications 
made by the Court of Appeals in the divorce decree." Id. at 543. 
A t! • -ugh there is no Utah case addressing whether a clain I foi I inji list 
enrichment can lie in the context of a married couple seeking a divorce, case law 
from across the country does. For instance, the Pyeatte decision is again 
instructive. After holding that the wife in that case could not recover on her breach 
of contract case (for the case-specific reasons discussed above), the court turned to 
o 
her unjust enrichment claim. In addressing whether unjust enrichment is 
appr- v ' - *"ext of the mar'1 <" r^nnonship, the coi ii t held tl lat 
[wjhere both spouses perform the usual and incidental activities of the 
marital relationship, upon dissolution there can be no restitution for 
performance of those activities. [Citation omitted.] Where, however, 
the facts demonstrate an agreement between the spouses and an 
extraordinary or unilateral effort by one spouse which inures solely to 
the benefit of the other by the time of the dissolution, the remedy of 
restitution is appropriate. 
The elements for such a claim under Arizona law are similar to those under Utah 
law. Compare Pyeatte, 135 Ariz, at 202, 661 P.2d at 352 with Deseret Miriah, 
2000 UT 83,^| 13, 12P.3dat582. 
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Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. At 203, 661 P.2d at 353. In addressing the situation where the 
spouse of a graduate student works to support the student, the court cited the 
"emerging consensus" that "restitution to the working spouse is appropriate to 
prevent unjust enrichment of the student spouse.55 Id. at 354-55 (citing cases); 
accord In re Weinstein, 128 111. App. 3d 234, 241, 470 N.E.2d 551, 557 (111. App. 
1984) (noting that although there is a "seeming divergence of opinion [among 
various states] on the characterization of a degree or license, there is nevertheless 
clear agreement that the contributing spouse should be entitled to some form of 
compensation for the financial efforts and support provided to the student spouse 
in the expectation that the marital unit would prosper in the future as a direct result 
of the couple's previous sacrifices.55). 
The trend is for courts to recognize the importance of avoiding a windfall to 
the student spouse to the detriment of the working spouse. As the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals acknowledged, "[a]s a matter of economic reality the most valuable 
asset acquired by either party during this six-year marriage was the husband's 
increased earning capacity. . . . In cases such as this, equity demands that courts 
seek extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice.55 Inman v. Inman, 
578 S.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Ky. App. 1979). Although the Inman court is correct 
that this situation would justify "extraordinary remedies55 to avoid the injustice 
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present* .* •• ;ah, the courts need look i 10 farthei 1:1 lai 1 tl ic 01 (ill lai y remedy • of 
unjust enrichment. 
Defendant argues, again based on Martinez, that the remedies Plaintiff seeks 
are too speculative. Even setting aside the fact that Martinez is wholly 
distinguishable from this case, the fact that damages may be speculative is not a 
proper basis for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motic • • ic .\uininez court made its 
decision after the case had been tried and the actual facts 1 lad beei 1 detern 111 led by 
the trial court. It was not decided on a motion to dismiss where the court was 
obligated to view fact and inference in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. This argument is, at best, premature and should be rejected. 
Defendant again relies on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Specifically, he asserts 
that with the post-Martinez amendments to that statute, there is no need for an 
unjust enrichment claim. After all, the courts are directed "• o .:,* "^ -M-- v 
recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage." The facts of this case directly and starkly 
contradict Defendant's argument. Despite the divorce action court's findings that 
Defendant was at fault for the dissoh ition of tl le i nai i iage and that Plaintiff 
contributed directly to Defendant's skill by paying for or allowing Defendai 
attend school during the marriage (Memorandum Decision at 3-4, 5), the trial court 
o o 
JJ 
awarded no alimony at all. If Defendant truly believed the arguments he is making 
to this Court about the sufficiency of alimony, he would not have argued to the 
trial court that no alimony should be awarded in this case. The alimony result in 
this matter establishes beyond question the vagaries of divorce remedies as 
compared to breach of contract and unjust enrichment remedies. 
Finally, Defendant tries to undermine the foregoing analysis by citing the 
decision in Kuder v. Schroeder 430 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. App. 1993). Defendant 
argues that the rule of this case is to view the extraordinary efforts that Plaintiff 
undertook and the deprivations she suffered should simply be viewed as "providing 
income, domestic assistance, and other services." Brief of Petitioner at 13. 
Defendant cites no authority that Utah accepts the rule that North Carolina applied 
in that case. Moreover, as society has evolved and changed, we have learned that 
treating women as the domestic help without equal rights before the law or in the 
marital relationship does not serve society's interests. Defendant's ideas on this 
subject are throwbacks to the 1950s, if not further. Even if one were to interpret 
Defendant's position as only being that of spouses assisting each other in the 
common manner that spouses often do, Plaintiffs efforts to put Defendant through 
undergraduate and medical school went far beyond income and domestic 
assistance. They included foregoing her own educational and professional 
34 
opportunities and the accepting for a significant period of a lower stai ida i d of 
living than would otherwise have been required. 
Thus, because Plaintiffs Complaint establishes a viable claim for unjust 
enrichment, its dismissal must be reversed. 
IV. REQUIRING SPOUSES TO COMPLY WITH THEIR EXPRESS 
PROMISES WILL PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE INSTITUTION 
OF MARRIAGE 
Defendant argues that the Martinez case stands as a protectioi 1 of the 
institution of marriage against its exploitation as primarily an econoi :i lie j :»iiit 
venture. Brief of the Petitioner at 18-19. He expresses concern for the degradation 
that marriage as an institution will suffer if Plaintiffs claims are allowed to 
proceed. Id. at 19. 
Such arguments ring hollow when the Martinez case is being used to excuse 
the p!iilaiidering spouse from keeping the specific commitnv* > - n . 
spouse tl mt lo;; ' all/y suppor - • ...: r- -<! *!..**-. .. 
at great personal sacrifice to herself. The true threat to marriage would be having 
individuals know that their spouse's promises are wholly unenforceable. It is 
important to the institution that individuals realize that there are consequences if 
they should fail to live up to their promises to their spouse, whether those are 
traditional marital promises (the consequence therefor beim -f — > 
remedies of alimony, property division, and child support) or other promises that 
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are more akin to contracts. It is such consequences that give individuals the 
willingness to continue to work at the marital relationship even when things are 
difficult. 
For instance, in many cases, it will be very much in the interest of both 
parties to a marriage for one of the spouses to seek a higher education. Such an 
endeavor will of necessity require substantial personal sacrifices by the other 
spouse (often the wife). If the wife knows that the husband will be able to leave 
after the education is complete and not provide to her any of the benefits of that 
education, it would be a rare wife willing to make those personal sacrifices. The 
result of that would be that fewer marriages will have a spouse seeking a higher 
education, even though it might be absolutely clear that such an education would 
make both parties (and their family) better off. 
If the Court truly wishes to protect the institution of marriage, it should 
make it clear that spouses that make express commitments to each other will not be 
able to avoid those commitments just by getting divorced (or by making life so 
miserable for the spouse that the spouse has no reasonable alternative but to seek 
divorce). A ruling in favor of Plaintiff will enhance the favor with which the State 
of Utah treats marriage. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the 
decision of the trial court, reinstate the claims in her Complaint, thereby allowing 
Plaintiff the opportunity to proceed forward in the normal course with her claims. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2009. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Scott P. Card 
Matthew R. Howell 
3301 N. University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
i t 
RESPONDENT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 26 day of 
February, 2009, to the following: 
David J. Hunter 
Dexter & Dexter 
1360 South 740 East 
Orem, Utah 84097 
7t6&&c#u*tf 
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A D D E N D U M A 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by 
the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year from the making of the agreement;. . . 
A D D E N D U M B 
30 4 '. Disposition of property Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children -- Division of debts - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction -- Custody and parent-time -- Determination of alimony --
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
( 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable 
and necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
i an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
"(ligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligation . 
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresse ,inil 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(?) The court: may include, in an order determining child support, an 
order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care 
expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by 
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determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the 
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of 
the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to 
children born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of 
divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation 
rights of grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-
time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing 
any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time 
provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order 
the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys1 fees expended by the 
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition 
was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a 
parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the 
immediate family where a visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court 
may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees 
and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other 
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-
time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any 
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by 
the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant 
facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony 
on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of 
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during 
the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed 
at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration 
dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (0 The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of 
the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection 
(8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability 
to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the 
court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of 
alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any 
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former 
spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is 
made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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Judge: Gary D. Stott 
This case came before the Court on December 12, 2007. Both parties gave testimony and 
additional evidence was received. The petitioner, Gloria Hayley Ashby, requested that she be 
awarded a fair and equitable award of alimony. Exhibit 1 is a stipulation of facts that the parties 
agreed to. The Court has relied on that stipulation as to some of the following information. 
The parties married on December 6, 1997. Prior to this marriage, Gloria obtained an 
associates degree in interior design from LDS Business College. Dallen attended Brigham Young 
University during the marriage from about 1997 to 2000 and obtained a bachelor's degree in 
chemical engineering. Besides going to school, he spent much of his time doing extracurricular 
activities to make his application to medical school appear more competitive. Gloria worked to 
support him in this effort and was the primary financial provider while he worked part-time. He was 
accepted into medical school at St. Louis University. He had never applied to the University of 
Utah, which was the couple's first choice for medical school because of Gloria's work in Utah 1 Ic 
had procrastinated applying, missed the deadline, and told Gloria that he had not been accepted to 
the school. 
To support Dallen in his educational efforts at St. Louis University, Gloria had to leave 
employment with Lance Turnei, hei mentoi in the interior design business His business has 
substantial value because she had allegedly been woikmg on a $12 million lemodel pioject seven 
months before leaving to St Louis She fuither claimed that Lance Tuinei offered to turn ovei his 
business to her She could not accept the allegedly lucrative business opportunity because she and 
Dallen had to move to Missoun She explained this was a significant sacrifice and loss Glona, 
howevei, offeied no cotroboiatmg testimony to validate these claims Such supposing testimony 
as to hei losses would have been helpful to the Couit 
Once in St Louis, Dallen attended medical school from appioximately 2000 to 2004 He 
obtained school loans that paid foi tuition, books, and some living expenses each semestei Altet 
obtaining a medical degiee, he participated in a medical internship at St Louis Univeisity irom 
about 2004 to 2005 Dining the time in St Louis, Gloria staited hei own mtenoi design business 
contiacting with designeis and aichitects, and was the pnmary financial piovidei She avoided 
permanent woik because of then mutual plans foi a family Dallen helped hei mostly with the 
busmess's accounting needs and buying material The fust year was difficult, bi t Gloria testified 
that hei business became successful a^tciwaids 
The two separated on oi about May 1, 2005 when Gloria moved out of the n apartment in j 
she leturned to Utah where she has resided since Dallen moved to Chicago in approximately June 
2005 to begin his residency He has approximately two years left to complete the i esidency and then 
will do a fellowship Aftei almost eight years of man rage, Gloria fried for a Utah divorce in Octobei 
200*5 At the time of tnal, Dallen was in his thud yeai of iesidency as a medical doctoi, s\as 
employed by a hospital in Chicago, and will leave residency and the fellowship that follows his 
residency in about 2010 
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Gloria is currently employed as an interior designer She has worked in this field for about 
ten years. Both Dallen and Gloria have approximately equivalent incomes of about $4,000 per 
month. Their earnings and incomes are not expected to change significantly over the next thiee 
years Testimony at trial established that Dallen's income will only increase about $1,000 to $2,000 
per year during his fellowship Their living expenses are also approximately equal and both of them 
can pay then lespective living expenses from their separate incomes. After paying for their living 
expenses each month, neither one of them is able to save. The standard of living that they both 
enjoy is about the same as when they were married Dallen has remarried and his new wife is 
expecting a child that is due in February At the time of trial, Gloria was thirty and Dallen was 
thirty-one years of age The two have no mmoi children born as issue in the maniage 
Dallen plans on becoming a diagnostic radiologist as opposed to an interventional 
radiologist An interventional radiologist would earn more money. Even as a diagnostic radiologist, 
he expects his income will be four to five times more than what he currently earns. Both financial 
expci ts at ti lal said his actual income, however, will be subject to the geographical aiea in which he 
works, the place he works (whether it be a hospital, clinic, oi private practice), the area of focus he 
actually practices, the length of time he will practice in that aiea, the date at which he begins the 
focus area, the state of the economy, and the then-current laws governing the medical piofession 
At trial. Dallen explained that in the year 2000, about two to thiee years aftei he was mamed, 
he was looking at pornography Gloi la testified that she discoveied the pornography in the summer 
of that year and was deeply concerned. Several months latei, m February of 2001, Gloria was 
diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease Dallen complained that foi the next several yeais, 
she stiongly encouraged him to seek counseling for the pornography He undertook counseling m 
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Utah through LDS Family Services and through two different counseling institutions in St. Louis. 
Gloria requested that he see a counselor on a weekly basis to overcome the pornography addiction. 
For three months, he falsely reported to her about his ongoing treatment. He fabricated the 
counselor's name, the subjects discussed, the plans they made at their weekly sessions, and the 
progress he was making. A few weeks before Gloria separated from Dallen in 2005, she discovered 
a locker concealing eight to ten pornographic videos. During the course of the marriage, Gloria and 
Dallen both claim they had never been unfaithful in having sexual relations with others. Based on 
this information, the Court finds that Dallen's conduct in viewing pornography and deceiving his 
wife substantially contributed to the destruction of the marriage. 
According to Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), a trial court, in setting alimony, 
must attempt to provide support for the receiving spouse sufficient to maintain the spouse at the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage as nearly as possible. In determining the amount of 
the award necessary to accomplish this aim, the court must make adequate findings and conclusions 
demonstrating that it has considered three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the party 
seeking alimony; (2) that party's ability to produce a sufficient income; and (3) the ability of the 
other party to provide support. Id. See also Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 
P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The first factor has been stipulated to by the parties. Gloria's financial condition is about 
the same as Dallen's, they enjoy about the same standard of living that they had during their 
marriage, they are able to meet their living expenses, and they both make about $4,000 a month. 
The second factor concerning Gloria's ability to produce sufficient income is clear. Based on her 
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past interior design experiences, education, and current employment status, she is capable of 
producing a sufficient income to support herself. The third factor as to Dallen's ability to provide 
support has been established as he makes about $4,000 a month. Although he cannot save, he can 
presumably provide some support by cutting expenses, managing his money well, and being more 
frugal. In the balance, these factors militate against awarding alimony. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a), the court shall consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony: (1) the length of the marriage; (2) whether the recipient spouse has 
custody of minor children requiring support; (3) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business 
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (4) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed 
to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. Here, the marriage lasted almost 
eight years, there are no children, Gloria did not work in a business owned or operated by Dallen, 
and she contributed directly to Dallen's increase in skill by allowing him to attend school during the 
marriage while being the primary financial provider. The fourth factor is the only one that militates 
in favor of awarding alimony. The Court notes, however, that Dallen's circumstances have allowed 
Gloria to gain substantial occupational experiences in the interior design field. Not only has she 
worked with established interior design companies and on an allegedly multi-million dollar project, 
but she has also obtained skills in doing so that have enabled her to start her own business, which, 
by her own account, became a success. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c), as a general rule in determining alimony, the 
court should look to the standard of living existing at the time of separation. The Code also states 
that the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles. Id. When a marriage of long 
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duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in determining the amount of alimony. 
Id. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in awarding alimony. Id. 
Generally, alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed. Id. Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the 
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or 
death of that former spouse. Id. 
Here, the standard of living existing at the time of separation has not changed significantly 
The mamage lasted almost eight years. Seven years is clearly a mamage of "short" duration. Boyle 
v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("the marriage lasted only 7 years, and the short 
marriage resulted in a diminution of the wife's assets."). The Court finds, therefore, that the 
marriage here is one of short duration. Both Dallen's and Gloria's earning capacities have been 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage. The Court finds, though, that the 
testimony at trial by both the parties' financial experts established that Dallen's future income 
cannot be predicted with any reasonable degree of probability. According to Osguthorpe v. 
Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), it is well within the court's discretion to determine 
that Dallen has the ability to earn more money. Relying on evidence sufficiently detailed in its 
findings of fact, a trial court will not abuse its discretion in imputing income to the defendant spouse 
for purposes of determining an alimony award. Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1996). Because Dallcn has a medical degree,1 is doing his medical residency, and will be 
completing a fellowship in the next few years, he has the ability to earn more money than he is 
presently earning as a result of both their efforts. Based only on these facts, however, the Court 
cannot reasonably impute any specific amount of income. 
When questioned about the duration of the alimony she had in mind, Gloria said she wanted 
it to continue beyond remarriage. She believes she has a right to her husband's advanced degree, 
that she greatly enhanced his earning capacity, that she made substantial employment sacrifices, and 
that his fault in destroying the marriage justify the ongoing award. Under Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(8)(b), the court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. The Court has 
found that Dallen is at fault because his interest in pornography and untruthfulness to Gloria 
substantially contributed to the destruction of the marriage. This factor militates in favor of 
awarding alimony, yet the way Gloria envisions it, a fair and equitable alimony would punish Dallen 
for his misconduct, reward her for the sacrifices she has made for him, and serve as a continuing 
entitlement to his medical degree, which she believes she has rights to, even after she remarries. 
These, however, are not the purposes of alimony. The puipose of alimony is to provide support for 
the wife, not to reward her or to inflict a penalty upon the husband. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409 (Utah 1977). She needs no support, she may not be rewarded for her sacrifices and Dallen may 
not be penalized by alimony. 
Gloria's idea of alimony is essentially the same as the concept of "equitable restitution" that 
the Utah Supreme Court struck down in Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). There, 
Petersen v Peteiseiu 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987). an adxanced degree is oi confers an intangible right 
which, because of its character, cannot propeily be characterized as property subject to division between the spouses. 
Traditional alimony analysis is the appropriate and adequate method for making adjustments between the parties in 
the cases of this type, Raybum v Raybunu 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct. App. 1987): an advanced degree or professional 
license is not marital property subject to division upon divorce. However, an advanced degree often accompanies a 
disparity in earning potential that is appropriately considered as a factor in alimony analysis. 
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the husband went through medical school. Four years after his graduation, he and his wife were 
divorced. After she appealed her limited award of alimony, among other things, the court concluded 
that she should have been better compensated. She had "earned an award of some permanent 
financial benefit, in her own right, that will allow her to share in the economic benefits achieved 
through their joint efforts" and that her husband's earning capacity "must be recognized in 
fashioning those legal and equitable remedies necessary to assist the plaintiff to readjust her life." 
Id. at 539 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the appellate court created a new type of 
interest that it termed "equitable restitution." Id. at 539-540. 
The Supreme Court, however, struck down the findings as to "equitable restitution." First, 
a marriage "is not comparable to a commercial partnership" and the efforts each spouse makes "for 
the other and for their common marital interests cannot be quantified in monetary terms, their 
respective contributions netted out, and a balance struck at the termination of the marriage." Id. at 
540. It explained, "The very idea of marriage contemplates mutual effort and mutual sacrifice." Id. 
The second reason was because "an award of equitable restitution would be extraordinarily 
speculative." Id. at 541. And the third reason was because an equitable restitution award based on 
a medical degree was "essentially indistinguishable" from valuing it as a property interest, which 
is improper. Id. 
Based on Martinez and for the additional findings set forth above, Gloria's request for 
alimony cannot be sustained because under the circumstances here, it would operate like 
compensation to a business partner. Any amount of alimony based on Darren's enhanced earning 
capacity would be too speculative because his future income cannot be predicted with any degree 
of reasonable probability. And awarding her alimony because of the medical degree he earned 
during the marriage would essentially be giving her property rights in his advanced degree, which 
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is not recognized under the law. Counsel for Respondent shall prepare the appropriate Findings and 
Order and submit them for this Court's signature. 
Dated this a^ day oLX^MUUP^1^2^ 
u 
Judge Gary D. St6tt 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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